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Knowledge about how reviewers serving on in-
terdisciplinary panels produce evaluations that 
are perceived as fair is especially lacking. This 
paper draws on 81 interviews with panelists serv-
ing on five multidisciplinary fellowship competi-
tions. We identify how peer reviewers define 
“good” interdisciplinary research proposals, and 
how they understand the procedures for selecting 
such proposals. To produce an evaluation they 
perceive as fair, panelists must respect the pri-
macy of disciplinary sovereignty, deference to 
expertise and methodological pluralism. These 
rules ensure the preponderance of the voices of 
experts over non-experts in interdisciplinary 
panels. In addition, panelists adopt a range of 
tactics and strategies designed to make other re-
viewers who lack such expertise trust that their 
judgments are disinterested and unbiased. 
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HE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of Duke University 
Press — known for publishing interdiscipli-
nary works in literary studies and other fields 
— contends that interdisciplinary work is harder to 
evaluate than to produce. While scholars doing   
interdisciplinary research may routinely use work 
from other disciplines, they fail to check their disci-
plinary ‘hats’ at the door when assessing research 
that appropriates theories, methods, and topics   
produced by their own discipline. Too often, when 
serving as evaluators, such scholars view interdisci-
plinary work as “careless” or “misguided” because it 
uses “tools from the discipline without understand-
ing their attendant histories, contexts and shortcom-
ings” (Wissoker, 2000: B4). 
Moreover, when they assess work from a disci-
pline other than their own, they may lack the disci-
plinary expertise needed to evaluate research. 
Because it is “difficult to identify peers whose ex-
pertise fully encompasses” all the knowledge needed 
to evaluate interdisciplinary scholarship, the very 
notion of “peer” review is called into question in the 
case of interdisciplinarity (Porter and Rossini, 1985: 
33; see also Laudel, 2004). Despite such hurdles,   
review panels are regularly called upon to judge the 
value of interdisciplinary work. If evaluating inter-
disciplinary work is inherently problematic, how is it 
accomplished? 
We address this question by drawing on 81 inter-
views conducted with panelists serving on 12 fund-
ing panels that are part of five American 
multidisciplinary fellowship competitions in the   
humanities and the social sciences. Our analysis 
breaks with the standard approach to the study of 
peer review, which is overwhelmingly concerned 
with the roadblocks to distributional “fairness 
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caused by nonscientific influences such as politics, 
friendship networks, or common institutional posi-
tions” (Travis and Collins, 1991: 324). This ap-
proach posits normative rules — universalism and 
disinterestedness — that characterize fair evaluation 
(Merton, 1973 [1942]), and it tries to assess whether 
the outcome of the evaluation is consistent with this 
definition. Studies typically seek to determine 
whether judgments about substantive quality are in 
some way biased by the consideration of personal 
qualities or personal ties by measuring who gets 
funded or published (Cole et al, 1978; GAO, 1994; 
Zuckerman and Merton, 1971). 
Our research breaks with this standard approach 
in at least two ways. First, instead of positing the 
existence of normative rules, we identify inductively 
the criteria that panelists use to judge the substantive 
quality of interdisciplinary proposals – for instance, 
they value proposals that balance breadth and origi-
nality with depth and empirical rigor. Second, we 
identify inductively the rules that they say they fol-
low to produce fair evaluations, such as deferring to 
expertise and using “disciplinary contextualization” 
(whereby proposals are to be judged first and fore-
most according to the standards of the discipline 
from which they originate
1). By examining the social 
sciences and humanities, where the diversity of cri-
teria of evaluation is allegedly greater than in the 
natural sciences (Kuhn, 1970), we also provide a 
corrective to the literature on interdisciplinarity, 
which, as far as it has focused on the natural sci-
ences, has tended to downplay the influence of dis-
ciplinary variation in criteria of evaluation on the 
intersubjective production of the belief in fairness 
among panelists. 
The dimensions of interdisciplinary evaluation we 
focus on, the criteria and the process of evaluation, 
raise two analytically distinct problems that we ana-
lyze in this paper. The first kind of problem faced by 
panelists in interdisciplinary panels consists in find-
ing the relevant criteria used to define good inter-
disciplinary proposals. Second, panelists meet a 
different kind of problem posed by the difficulty of 
collectively identifying the proposals that fit with 
their criteria in a manner they will perceive as 
“fair”.
2 Our two empirical sections explore succes-
sively how panelists in interdisciplinary panels over-
come these two problems to produce the belief, 
expressed without exception by the panelists we in-
terviewed, that their panels were able to identify the 
most deserving proposals — the belief, in short, that 
the outcome was fair. 
In so doing, our paper provides an analytical de-
scription  of  aspects  of  interdisciplinary  evaluation 
that are not well-understood. As such, our contribu-
tion is less to enrich our understanding of causal pro-
cesses already identified, than to shed light on aspects 
of the process of evaluation that have been neglected 
to  date.  Our  research  focuses  exclusively  on  inter-
disciplinary  panels  and  lacks  direct  evidence  on  
disciplinary peer evaluation.
3
 Our research does not 
directly test the relevance of Merton’s (1973 [1942]) 
conventional ideas on “fairness” in disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary  peer  evaluation.  Doing  so  would  
require direct evidence of the processes we describe 
here in both kinds of panels. Further systematic com-
parative studies of peer evaluation are needed to give 
a clear explanation of the differences between intra-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary evaluation. 
In the following section, we present the data and 
methods on which our analyses are based. Then, we 
discuss the criteria that panelists use to distinguish 
‘good’ interdisciplinary proposals from ‘bad’ ones. 
Next, we describe how panelists perceive the rules 
they follow in producing a collective evaluation that 
they perceive as fair, focusing on the rules of disci-
plinary sovereignty, deference to expertise and 
methodological pluralism. Our discussion of these 
rules directly builds on Mallard et al (under review) 
and Lamont (forthcoming). Finally, we examine 
how panelists resolve the threats to fairness posed by 
disciplinary distance and familiarity. 
Data and methods 
We examine academic evaluation in the specific 
context of multidisciplinary panels that distribute 
fellowships to graduate students and faculty mem-
bers in the social sciences and the humanities. This 
setting presents some distinctive characteristics as 
compared with the peer review of journal submis-
sions or the departmental evaluation of faculty 
members for promotion. Most importantly, it brings 
together scholars who come from different discipli-
nary horizons, and who therefore often have to make 
explicit their theoretical and methodological prefer-
ences, given the low level of disciplinary knowledge 
they can count on sharing with other evaluators. 
Most of the proposals under consideration by these 
panels are interdisciplinary as explained below. Ap-
preciation for interdisciplinary scholarship is also 
one of the criteria used for selecting panelists, ac-
cording to the program officers we interviewed.
4 
Panelists were all actively engaged in research. 
We conducted interviews with panelists serving 
on 12 funding panels attached to five different mul-
tidisciplinary fellowship competitions in the social 
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sciences and the humanities. We studied each panel 
in two successive years. The funding competitions 
were held by the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC), the American Council of Learned Societies 
(ACLS), the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship 
Foundation (WWNFF), a Society of Fellows at a top 
research university, and an anonymous foundation in 
the social sciences.
5 These competitions were chosen 
because they cover a wide range of disciplines, and 
because they are all highly prestigious. While the 
SSRC and the WWNFF competitions are open to the 
social sciences and the humanities, the ACLS sup-
ports research in the humanities and in humanities-
related social sciences. The Society of Fellows sup-
ports work across a range of fields, whereas the 
anonymous foundation only supports work in the so-
cial sciences. The SSRC and the WWNFF programs 
provide support for graduate students, whereas the 
ACLS holds distinct competitions for assistant, as-
sociate, and full professors. The Society of Fellows 
provides fellowships to recent PhDs, and the 
anonymous social science foundation supports re-
search at all ranks. 
A total of 81 open-ended, semi-structured inter-
views with panel members in charge of final delib-
erations were conducted.
6 This total includes 66 
interviews with 49 different panel members (17 pan-
elists were interviewed twice, because they served 
on panels for the two years that the study lasted). In-
terviews lasted approximately 90 minutes and were 
conducted as soon as possible after the conclusion of 
panel deliberations, typically within a few days or at 
most within a few weeks. Interviews were conducted 
over the phone or, where possible, in person. Fifteen 
additional interviews were conducted with relevant 
program officers and panel chairpersons for each 
panel, who provided details about what had hap-
pened during the panel deliberation in the absence of 
direct observation.
7 Interviewees originated from a 
wide range of disciplines, reflecting the highly inter-
disciplinary nature of the competitions under study 
(see Table 1). 
Drawing on interview data was the best research 
strategy available given that issues of confidentiality 
create enormous hurdles to accessing peer review 
panels, a circumstance which has resulted in a pau-
city of research on peer review.
8 Although ideally 
our research would also draw on more direct obser-
vation and on a larger number of panels, our empiri-
cal data is optimal given the distinctive features of 
our topic. Saturation of information was reached 
with 71 interviews. Thus our project meets usual 
standards regarding sample size in qualitative re-
search (Ragin et al, 2004). 
A first battery of questions concerned how panel-
ists evaluated and ranked proposals prior to and dur-
ing the meetings (ie, both in isolation and in 
interaction). Respondents were asked to describe 
what they appreciated in the proposals they judged 
to be the best and the worst prior to the delibera-
tions.
9 They were also asked to describe the process 
by which proposals that had a high ranking prior to 
deliberation ended up not being funded, and how 
some low-ranked proposals were funded.
10 The gen-
eral strategy consisted of asking panelists to specify 
their own criteria of evaluation by producing 
“boundary work,” that is, by contrasting their 
evaluative standards with those of others (Lamont 
and Molnár, 2002): panelists were asked to describe 
how they perceived themselves to be similar to or 
different from other panelists. 
Interviews also concerned how decisions were 
reached, what factors facilitated the production of 
consensus and fostered fairness, and what factors   
led to the occasional breakdown of deliberations. 
Asking panelists to describe exchanges surrounding  
Table 1.  Disciplinary composition among interviewees per interdisciplinary fellowship competition 


















English  ………….. 2  3  2 1 0 8 
Art  History  ..…….. 0  1  0 1 0 2 
Musicology  ……... 0  2  0 0 0 2 
Philosophy  ………  0  1  1 0 0 2 
History …………..  1  4  2  6  1  14 
Geography  ……… 0  0 0  1  0  1 
Anthropology  ……  1  1  0 2 1 5 
Sociology  ………..  0  1  0 3 2 6 
Political  Science  ...  0  0  0 3 3 6 
Economics  ………  0  0  0 1 1 2 
Biology  …………. 0  0  1 0 0 1 
Total  N  =  4  13  6 18  8 49 
Note:   * We only include here panelists whom we interviewed, and we exclude panel chairs and program officers. Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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especially controversial proposals was particularly 
fruitful in revealing the diversity of arguments used 
by panelists, what styles they privileged and consid-
ered most appealing to others, and how they be-
lieved preferences for specific styles should be 
expressed.
11 We also asked panel chairs and program 
officers to comment on debates surrounding contro-
versial proposals in order to learn their understand-
ing of how fair outcomes are produced. 
Defining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ proposals 
The competitions we studied use appreciation for in-
terdisciplinary scholarship as a criterion for selecting 
panelists. However, evaluators are left to decide 
what defines a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ interdisciplinary 
proposal. According to the panelists we interviewed, 
the main challenge of interdisciplinary evaluation 
consists in assessing whether a proposal reaches the 
proper balance between breadth and originality on 
the one hand, and depth and empirical rigor on the 
other. 
What panelists appreciate most in good interdisci-
plinary proposals is the intellectual breadth they   
offer, which is intrinsically valued, and contrasted to 
a ‘narrow’ concern with advancing disciplinary 
knowledge. For instance, for a specialist of [In-
dian]
12 literature, good scholarship: 
pivots on interdisciplinarity, the ability to speak 
to different sets of people, albeit perhaps in 
fairly simple terms, where to other people aca-
demic excellence is very much rooted within 
developing a specific discipline or even a spe-
cific kind of field, a quite narrow field of 
knowledge. 
Similarly, a geographer puts a premium on interdis-
ciplinary breadth and originality, which she values 
over disciplinary “over-specialization” and a rigorous 
concern with “nice little data points”: 
To be an artful and talented geographer … you 
have to be able to talk the talk of several disci-
plines, [and] to be able to see where cutting 
edges are and take certain gambles in terms of 
advancing an idea. And so what it does as a 
discipline is to address the over-specialization 
that sometimes occurs … where you can study 
a quarter acre of a rain forest to death … I take 
a risk on what I think are interesting ideas, even 
if they’re bumping into different fields … [and] 
can’t always just get the numbers and the nice 
little data points … So it just then comes down 
to a call of, OK, how compelling do you think 
the topic is. 
Other scholars explicitly try to balance interdiscipli-
nary breath with disciplinary standards. This stance 
is best represented by a China specialist who argues 
for combining different criteria of evaluation: 
I wouldn’t want us to get enthusiastic about 
anything that didn’t have the endorsement of 
specialists who felt that, just as a first question, 
this [is] going to satisfy needs in your particular 
discipline. I mean only after we got a yes to 
that [question] would I want to go on and say, 
OK, now we apply the second tier of criteria, 
which is, “Is it going to do anything for any-
body else?” 
As these last quotes show, while panelists admire 
proposals that have implications for a broad range of 
disciplines and combined disciplinary elements in 
novel ways, they often fear that interdisciplinary 
proposals do not deploy these elements carefully 
enough to deepen existing knowledge. This tension 
is expressed by an English professor who contrasts 
the traditional criterion used to assess literary inter-
pretation as bearing on whether a scholar could per-
form a “subtle, accurate reading” (of a sonnet, for 
instance), with the criterion used to assess interdis-
ciplinary work, which is whether the argument is 
“plausible, persuasive, how evidence is used”.
13 
Thus, panelists worry that interdisciplinary scholar-
ship may be ‘looser’ than disciplinary scholarship, 
and that the standards by which it is evaluated are 
less exacting than those to be met by disciplinary 
scholarship. 
Bad interdisciplinary proposals are described as 
‘fast and loose’ and not sufficiently grounded theo-
retically. Thus, an English professor describes a 
‘good’ proposal in the following terms: 
[It was] very ambitious intellectually and I 
think will contribute significantly to our under-
standing to what it means to be a [citizen] … 
She wasn’t just staying focused on what I think 
would have seemed easiest to her. So it’s inter-
disciplinary, but it’s not fast and loose as an in-
terdisciplinary project. [She wasn’t just] 
throwing around some interdisciplinary vocabu-
lary … pulling in Homi  Bhabha and Benedict 
Anderson and throwing them into some kind 
theoretical soup, not really applying their theo-
ries in any kind of deep way. 
 
What panelists appreciate most in 
good interdisciplinary proposals is the 
intellectual breadth they offer, which 
is intrinsically valued, and contrasted 
to a ‘narrow’ concern with advancing 
disciplinary knowledge Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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Others describe bad interdisciplinary proposals as 
“lazy” or “flashy”, and as not appropriating the theo-
ries, tools and methods of other disciplines with   
sufficient rigor. Interdisciplinarity is perceived as 
presenting real dangers, in terms of using knowledge 
“outside your discipline, more as a rhetorical strat-
egy than as something in which you really steep 
yourself”. 
Interdisciplinary proposals also face particular 
challenges because they are perceived as more ambi-
tious, and therefore more challenging, than purely 
disciplinary proposals, and because they have to 
meet standards emanating from more than one disci-
pline. Indeed, one scholar attributes the failure of 
some interdisciplinary proposals not to the short-
comings of applicants but to their “ambition to reach 
beyond the person’s initial field; they’re risky. The 
person might not be able to do what they want to do. 
Over-ambitiousness [is] what [is] both attractive and 
fatal about some of the projects.” The challenge of 
serving more than one disciplinary master is under-
scored by an art historian who deplores that: 
We encourage students to [apply methods and 
theories across disciplines], but in the end they 
can become victims because they are seen as 
spreading themselves so thin that they can’t 
really carry out the research with enough steps 
and perception … For instance, you’re encour-
aged to do now art history and anthropology. 
So if you’re an art historian who does that, very 
often more traditional art historians will say, 
well that person is a closet anthropologist. But 
anthropologists don’t often take you seriously 
because your framework is often from fine arts 
and from art history. So it is a problem and I 
think the only way to get at it is to really do 
good research that manages to integrate disci-
plines in a compelling way. 
Thus, good interdisciplinary work combines differ-
ent tool kits in a disciplined way. This is stated by a 
historian: 
I’m interested in, not in the kind of interdisci-
plinarity that Stanley Fish once complained 
about, which is basically the person who makes 
up his own standards and therefore is bound by 
no one, but in consciously trying to sort of bro-
ker useful relations between disciplinary tool 
kits … [T]here’s a lot of contexts where I 
would like to also look at other disciplinary 
tool kits and, when it makes sense, use them in 
a way that’s disciplined. In other words, don’t 
sort of lazily grab from whatever looks useful, 
but to find a way to sort of think within the 
paradigms that another discipline is offering. 
In the end, what differentiates a good and a bad in-
terdisciplinary proposal is the applicant’s capacity to 
achieve her stated purpose while mastering research 
tools borrowed from one or more disciplines. This 
criterion, by which one can recognize good interdis-
ciplinary proposals, emerges clearly from our inter-
views. Less clear is how panelists understand the 
process by which they come to identify the proposals 
that fit with their definition of a good proposal, and 
which corresponds to their understanding of fairness 
in  evaluation.  In  the  next  section,  we  analyze  their 
understanding of such a process. 
Overcoming the paradoxes 
Panelists face additional challenges when engaging in 
the process of interdisciplinary evaluation. The panel-
ists emanating from the same discipline as the appli-
cant can lack the disciplinary distance needed to judge 
the  wider  interest  of  the  proposal  and  its  broader  
relevance. They may be too committed to disciplinary 
standards to spot proposals that open new vistas. On 
the contrary, those emanating from disciplines other 
than that of the applicant generally lack the special-
ized  knowledge  needed  to  evaluate  the  proposal.  
The  type  and  amount  of  evidence  under  review  is 
generally foreign to them. Thus, they have to rely (in 
blind faith) on the expertise of their more qualified 
peers. They do not know if the panelists most quali-
fied to judge a proposal are driven by their discipli-
nary  interests  and  biases  when  they  judge  the 
proposals originating from their discipline.
14 
Hence, in interdisciplinary evaluation, panelists 
face a dilemma when defining how much weight 
they should give to disciplinary as opposed to inter-
disciplinary concerns; and how they should justify 
their evaluations, one vis-à-vis the other. We show 
in this section how panelists adopt different tactics 
to overcome these inherent challenges to interdisci-
plinary evaluation. 
Critical evaluation and blind faith 
Because interdisciplinary proposals are broad by 
definition, it is often very challenging for panelists 
to determine the substantive merits of such propos-
als. As pointed out by an English scholar, panelists 
are rarely as qualified as the applicant to make such 
a determination: 
You take your theoretical frame from some 
existing source, such as … Foucault, so that it 
would be possible to judge whether someone 
was pursuing a Foucaultian reading in a proper 
way. [However], I felt that I certainly knew 
more about these [government] accounts [I was 
studying] than anybody else did, and that meant 
that nobody really ever could say that I was 
wrong, and that made me worried … They 
would inevitably be impressed by the fancy 
footwork that I performed with these sources, 
but … it would be difficult for someone to say 
that I had read them wrong. Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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To overcome the challenge of evaluating such a pro-
posal, panelists adopt customary rules that serve to 
limit the amount of arbitrariness that enters into the 
decision making process. One such rule is what we 
call deferring to expertise: although formally, panel-
ists have equal weight in decisions, each of them 
claims expertise on a specific subset of topics cov-
ered by the proposals.
15 The amount of authority that 
is accorded to them varies with their disciplinary af-
filiation and their own research areas, as well as 
whether or not they stake a claim on a topic – in line 
with Weber’s (1978 [1956]: 99–100) analysis of the 
role of expertise in providing legal-rational legiti-
macy.
16 A historian explained how this is accom-
plished, in the context of the discussion of a 
proposal on modernity and [the media in the United 
States]. He mentioned to the group that he had done 
work on the period covered by the proposal, and that 
for this reason he was particularly well-positioned to 
assess whether it was proposing anything new. He 
concluded, “I think I had expert advice here and I 
think that’s why she got [the funding], because I had 
expert advice.” 
Because  panelists  are  generally  recognized  as 
greater authority on proposals emanating from ‘their’ 
field, another, related, customary rule consists in re-
specting disciplinary sovereignty. Another historian 
spells out this culture of disciplinary deference: 
For a couple of proposals, I had to ‘explicate’ a 
research strategy that wasn’t fully explained. 
Historians would say “It’s an obvious ap-
proach, no problem!” but didn’t realize how 
other disciplines would not take for granted 
what the writer was taking for granted … 
Sometimes I almost felt uncomfortable about 
the deference that was given to my responses as 
a historian … [I thought] I’m the only one here 
and I hope I’m doing this right. There was a lot 
of credibility given to the way I responded to 
historical questions in particular. And I, of 
course, returned the deference to people in the 
other fields. 
This panelist underlines a paradox central to inter-
disciplinary evaluation. While panelists tend to defer 
to the expertise of experts, they are generally re-
quired to take position on topics that they know very 
little about, operating almost on blind faith. This is 
spelled out explicitly by an anthropologist who says 
that: 
In philosophy, I didn’t feel at all as if I were 
competent to evaluate those proposals. Either to 
say this is good or this is not good, I just did 
not know what was up with them. And in those 
cases I always deferred to the people who did 
have some kind of expertise in that field. 
Similarly, a historian explains why she deferred to a 
historian on Russia: 
There were times where I really wanted to con-
test what [she] had to say about some propos-
als, but when she comes in extremely expert 
and careful and a person I respect a lot, and 
says “No, there are eleven books on this in 
Russian and this is really a fairly banal pro-
posal”, then I just sort of say that must be true. 
So you know it looks good until somebody says 
there’s a whole literature that you cannot   
reasonably be expected to know, and then you 
just sort of say OK, no problem. 
This tension between blind faith and critical colle-
gial evaluation is scarcely acknowledged as delib-
erations occur. Panelists construe doubts about their 
expert judgment as a breach of the customary norm 
of deferring to expertise. Breaching the rules of def-
erence to expertise and respect of disciplinary sover-
eignty is the most frequent source of conflict among 
panelists (see Mallard et al, under review). 
A third customary rule is what we have called 
elsewhere “disciplinary contextualization”, which 
requires that panelists assess proposals using the 
standards that prevail in the field of scholarship of 
the applicant (Mallard et al, under review). This rule 
is associated with another rule, that of methodologi-
cal pluralism. Disciplinary contextualization is cap-
tured by an evaluator as he described the dynamics 
of his panel: 
I noted … the differences between people who 
work with large datasets and do quantitative re-
search. And then the very polar opposite, I sup-
pose, folks who are doing community level 
studies in anthropology. They are such different 
methodologies that it’s hard to say that there’s 
a generalizable standard that applies to both of 
them. We were all, I think, willing and able to 
understand the projects in their own terms, for-
tunately, and not try to impose a more general 
standard, because it would have been extremely 
difficult … I wouldn’t hold a candidate in po-
litical science responsible for what seemed to 
me to be having overly instrumental or dia-
grammatic ways of understanding what they’re 
going to do because they have to have those. 
 
Tension between blind faith and 
critical collegial evaluation is scarcely 
acknowledged as deliberations occur. 
Panelists construe doubts about their 
expert judgment as a breach of the 
customary norm of deferring to 
expertise Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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They have to have a certain clarity, they have 
to have a certain scientism, so I am not going to 
sit there and say “Well, where’s the fluidity, 
where’s the self-reflexivity, where’s the her-
meneutical content?” 
Thus, panels are not a forum for critically challeng-
ing other methodological or disciplinary traditions. 
The rules of the game require that methodological 
equality be recognized as a matter of principle, and 
that for the duration of the meeting, panelists bracket 
methodological boundary work, the process by 
which members of disciplines try to one-up one an-
other to gain credibility and professional jurisdiction 
(Gieryn, 1983; 1995). The customary rule of meth-
odological pluralism is further described by another 
political scientist who explains how he was accused 
of showing a lack of methodological pluralism:  
“I was basically being accused of being a posi-
tivist. No one ever said that because obviously 
that’s like calling somebody a communist. But 
there was a sense in which I was imposing my 
disciplinary bias inappropriately on other disci-
plines … . And my response was, ‘No I actu-
ally am holding [the applicant] to her own 
standards and I’m not trying to be hegemonic 
on this.’” 
Most evaluators think that if methods were to be 
critically discussed, conflicts between disciplines 
might render the evaluation process more tense, more 
polarized, and more unfair. A geographer expresses 
her frustration at a political scientist who refused to 
evaluate a proposal concerned with the analysis of 
“cultural meanings” with what she believed are the 
most appropriate standards. She says: 
This [proposal] is not about how many people 
are actually sick in a population, but rather how 
many are saying they’re sick in a population, 
which is about discourse. So it’s not going to fit 
into nice little number crunching. It’s about 
how people use issues to mobilize protests, and 
he was not willing to hear that or entertain that, 
and it made me mad. 
Similarly, a historian was critical of another historian 
who lacked disciplinary flexibility: 
She sort of has this one standard, the hypothesis, 
you  know,  “What’s  the  hypothesis?”  Some 
things  you’re  not  necessarily  hypothesizing 
about. She always had this one little test that she 
seemed to be applying to everything. That just 
seemed to me to be not the most productive way. 
Tactics of disinterestedness and the creation of trust 
As we have just seen, the judgments of disciplinary 
experts prevail over those of evaluators who lack 
disciplinary familiarity. Further, the ‘non-expert 
panelists coming from other disciplines do not have 
a full understanding of these disciplinary criteria, 
which would provide them with a sense of how idio-
syncratic these ‘expert’ judgments are. Confronted 
with this situation of blind faith, panelists could see 
the rules of evaluation (deference to expertise, re-
spect of disciplinary sovereignty and methodological 
pluralism) as leading to potentially unfair, arbitrary 
decisions. 
It is actually the contrary which happens. Because 
these non-experts are less able to judge the intrinsic 
weaknesses of the proposed research as judged in 
disciplinary terms (either in terms of methods, or in 
terms of originality of topic), they tend to read them 
in more favorable terms than the ones coming from 
their own discipline. Deliberations thus proceed in a 
way that leads panelists to be more critical of the 
proposals coming from their own discipline than of 
the ones coming from other disciplines. Many panel-
ists agreed that they judged proposals from other 
disciplines less harshly, mainly because they did not 
have the required expertise. And when the proposal’s 
topic was one familiar to the panelist, panelists could 
be more opinionated, because they felt they had the 
relevant knowledge to form a strong opinion.
17 
Most believed that panelists end up being most 
critical of proposals in their own field. An English 
professor explains: 
I tended to give high marks to some proposals 
that I had no education about the field but just 
sounded exciting. And then some other panelist 
would be able to say very quickly “This is not 
original work, you know.” There’d be no way 
for me to know that in advance. 
Similarly, a musicologist acknowledges: “People 
were particularly critical or cast a particularly sharp 
eye on work from their own field, in part because 
they knew the field and could evaluate the claims 
more effectively than a non-specialist.” Moreover, 
panelists often lose points by pushing their own 
field, as noted by a historian who describes the pan-
elist he liked least as someone who is “very inter-
ested in pushing her own field and is not as open to 
other fields. As she said herself, she’s pushing time 
periods, you know, that she’ll sponsor anything in 
the Middle Ages, kind of thing.” Being able to sway 
colleagues’ opinion and gain support for a proposal 
depends on the overall amount of credibility that one 
has accumulated, and respecting all the rules de-
scribed above contributes not only to maintaining 
the conditions for fair decision-making, but also to 
accumulating credibility with colleagues. 
In this case, panelists’ greater generosity toward 
proposals coming from other disciplines produced 
an increased sense of fairness about the decision 
process. Indeed, panelists could not be accused of 
defending their narrow self-interests by pushing 
their own disciplinary turfs.
18 Another important Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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way in which a lack of disciplinary familiarity is as-
sociated with an increased sense of fairness and dis-
interestedness is found when panelists disclose 
indirect or informal ties with candidates. Whereas 
network connections could be viewed as an asset in 
so far as they can be used to get reliable knowledge 
on an applicant’s capacity to achieve her project (as 
they are used for instance in the recruitment of stu-
dents and professors in academic departments), too 
much familiarity is immediately suspected of hiding 
self-interest on the part of the panelist who holds a 
close connection to the candidate.
19 Although there 
is no explicit requirement to do so, panelists also 
volunteered information on indirect ties in a number 
of cases (“This student’s mentor is a close collabora-
tor of mine” or “I know this student’s advisees very 
well and trust her letter”) as a way to muzzle them-
selves. For instance, when asked to describe his fa-
vorite proposal one historian said, 
That’s a little bit difficult because to be com-
pletely honest about it, the one that I liked the 
most was by a student who quoted me at 
length. I recused myself. I didn’t enter the dis-
cussion on that. She’s not literally my student. 
She did some independent work with me   
because she had no one else who could guide 
her work.
20 
Panelists are aware of the importance of limiting the 
‘corrupting impact’ of personal relationships that are 
formed in their own disciplines. Too close discipli-
nary familiarity can therefore threaten the universal-
istic and disinterested character of evaluations. For 
instance, a sociologist said that she chose not to of-
fer an opinion when the work of a former colleague, 
which she does not appreciate, was discussed. A 
panel chair explains how his particular funding pro-
gram tries for this reason to maximize the presence 
of panelists: 
who are not gatekeepers, and for policy reasons 
we actually almost always exclude people from 
the type of institutions that are more gate-
keeping institutions. We’re not allowed to have 
people from the Ivy League, [and] you did no-
tice there was nobody from Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton, Chicago. And we definitely do not 
include people from those institutions [that 
produce] large numbers of area studies types of 
applications. No Michigan, no Berkeley. 
Contrasting intellectual merit from social familiarity 
with the academic social elite, he adds that: 
It’s almost an unwritten rule that we’re looking 
for people who have the same intellectual level 
as [people in the] Ivy League, but are not con-
nected to the networks. We look for people 
who will decide applications on the basis of 
their intellectual merits, and not on who did it, 
where they’re coming from. 
One  of  the  panel  chairs  expresses  this  rule  clearly. 
Asked about how panelists were to react if a panelist 
stated: “This is a student of a close colleague of mine 
and I’d love to see his work funded.” He responded: 
It’s just not a consideration. It can’t be a con-
sideration. You probably noticed that the panel 
rejected quite roundly a student of [the presi-
dent of the funding agency], who described him 
as the best student he’d had in 25 years … No-
body thought about that … There are other 
types of biases that other people bring to the 
meetings, but they tend to be well camouflaged 
… I hear criticisms from colleagues that say, 
“Oh man, you’re just funding [Berkeley] an-
thropology, it’s because you have all these 
[Berkeley] anthropologists on your panel.” 
That’s the most primitive kind of interpreta-
tion! They have no idea what’s inside the black 
box and they make these primitive assumptions 
about interest. And what I can tell you is that in 
my experience it looks the opposite. The more 
specialists you have on the Middle East, the 
fewer Middle East proposals are going to get 
through. Because people tend to be really tough 
on their discipline, to the point where they’re 
too tough and we have to think of ways to 
make them mellow to get them to say yes. 
Panelists use other tactics to gain credibility and a 
reputation of disinterestedness. If some are obvi-
ously harsh on their own discipline, others excuse 
themselves for being too harsh on others in anticipa-
tion of potential criticisms. For instance, a panelist 
explains how he manages his disciplinary prejudices 
by being transparent about them: 
As I was scoring these proposals I started to be 
suspicious that I was giving lower scores to an-
thropology and history proposals than from the 
other social sciences. In part, because the criteria 
that I think are important are somewhat disci-
pline-specific.  But,  you  know,  keeping  this  
in  mind,  trying  not  to  let  that  influence  me  
too  much,  I  went  through  and  …  did  some  
calculations to find out whether I did have a dis-
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ciplinary bias in scoring, and I did, as I expected. 
It wasn’t extreme, but it was there … And so, 
when we met I just fessed up. I said, “You know, 
I think I have a bias in terms of scoring lower for 
anthropology  and  history”  …  This  particular 
panel, for whatever reason, could be just the luck 
of the draw, seems very open-minded and will-
ing to accept the possibility that we each have 
our particular disciplinary process we use. 
This tactic, which requires that scholars hold   
themselves up voluntarily to not be too harsh on dis-
ciplines they have not mastered, shows how a lack 
of disciplinary familiarity can be used to signal a 
high level of disinterestedness. 
The lack of disciplinary familiarity helps give 
panelists the sense that discussions proceed as 
though panelists were abstracted from social net-
works and operating as free agents without any per-
sonal agenda, and as if clientelism and particularism 
could not influence the decision-making process. Far 
from imperiling the fairness of the evaluation pro-
cess, panelists’ lack of familiarity with most of the 
disciplines represented in interdisciplinary panels of-
fers an additional guarantee of fairness of the pro-
cess of decision-making. 
But disciplinary differences in the extent to which 
panelists will ‘push their disciplines’ are also very 
obvious when comparing the attitudes of historians 
with those of philosophers, classicists, or art histori-
ans whose disciplines gather awards much less fre-
quently, in part because these are small fields that 
generate far fewer applicants. The propensity to be 
disinterested varies according to disciplinary re-
sources, as expressed by a historian who says: 
I generally try to give disciplines very far from 
me the benefit of the doubt. Maybe if there’s 
something I like but don’t understand, I’ll boost 
it up and not always successful, but also some-
times I am a little bit harder on ones in my own 
discipline going in … a plus or minus easier or 
harder because I just don’t want to just be bow-
ing to people in American History one hundred 
percent of the time … But again history does 
very well, it’s a luxury I can afford. 
Two philosophers who served on panels were de-
scribed by other panelists as very eager to see their 
own discipline represented on the lists of awardees 
— philosophy proposals tend to receive few awards, 
according to a program officer. Conversely, histori-
ans take it so much for granted that their field will be 
represented that their concern for diversity often fo-
cuses on which geographical areas and period of his-
tory the proposal covers. A panel that makes many 
history awards may be defined as diverse if it in-
cludes proposals that concern non-Western topics. 
The inverse relationship between generosity toward 
other disciplines and scarcity may suggest important 
differences in the degree to which members of   
different disciplines engage or can afford to engage 
in overtly disinterested behavior.
21 
When tastes matter 
According to Weber, rational legitimacy comes from 
the application of impersonal and consistent rules, 
which can then be regarded as producing “objective” 
evaluations. According to this view, panelists who 
believe in the fairness of the deliberation will try ex-
plicitly to bracket their idiosyncratic tastes while 
evaluating proposals, as research on peer evaluation 
inspired by Merton has largely repeated (Cole and 
Cole, 1981; Cole, 1992; GAO, 1994). In interdisci-
plinary panels, however, panelists who are not from 
the same discipline as an applicant lack the mastery 
of the disciplinary technical standards to judge the 
proposal. Therefore, they have to justify their 
evaluations in reference to other criteria than purely 
technical and objective standards. In particular, they 
allow their tastes and idiosyncrasies to play a greater 
role than would be expected if they adhered to Mer-
tonian norms. These tastes often concern who they 
are and who they think the panelist is — for exam-
ple, judging the “moral character” of the panelist, as 
shown by Guetzkow et al (2004). For instance, an 
English professor argues that even though one needs 
to establish a distinction and hierarchy between 
one’s personal preferences and criteria of compe-
tence, he still views the first ones as legitimate indi-
cations of the academic quality of a proposal: 
What I found with these things, you need to use 
two sets of criteria. One is a sort of criteria 
which is your best professional judgment in as 
neutral a way as you can manage it, independ-
ent of your taste. And the other one is allowing 
for your tastes, if they don’t get in the way of 
each other. I think one should always give up 
the personal one, if the arguments of other peo-
ple seem sound, and not give up the other one. 
This scholar subordinates personal preferences to 
more neutral standards, while acknowledging that 
the latter are intrinsic to the evaluation process. 
Thus, he protects the legitimacy of the process while 
recognizing the role of idiosyncratic preferences in 
evaluation. Similarly, a political scientist establishes 
a clear distinction between evaluating the choice of 
topic, which is not “objective”, and evaluating the 
quality of the proposal, which is more unambigu-
ously an object of expertise, “amenable to the can-
ons of academic excellence”. Judging theoretical 
approaches and research designs requires expertise, 
whereas judging the importance of a topic is often 
more a matter of taste. Panelists tend to like what 
speaks to their own personal tastes, as one of them 
acknowledges: “I see scholarly excellence and ex-
citement in this one project on [food], possibly   
because I see resonance with my own life, my own 
interests, who I am, and other people clearly don’t.” Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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Multiple examples of how panelists’ idiosyncratic 
tastes shape their vote can be found in the inter-
views, especially when they lack the technical com-
petence to judge proposals. A panelist who loves 
modern dance could confess in an interview (without 
hesitation): “The one on [dance] [I liked a lot]; I’m 
an avid dance person … in terms of studying dance, 
the history of dance and vernacular dance in particu-
lar. So I found that one really interesting, very 
good.” Similarly, an anthropologist supported a pro-
posal on [songbirds], which she explains by the fact 
that she had just come back from Tucson where she 
had been observing [songbirds]. An English scholar 
supports a proposal on [sports], and ties her interest 
to the fact that she was an elite tennis player in high 
school. An historian doing cross-cultural, compara-
tive work is very explicit in stating that he favors 
proposals with a similar emphasis. Another historian 
doing research on non-Western societies gives extra 
points to proposals that are looking beyond the 
West. Yet another panelist ties her opposition to a 
proposal on [Viagra] to the fact that she is a lesbian: 
I will be very candid here, this is one place 
where I said, OK, in the way that I live my life 
and my practices, because of who I fell in love 
with, I have ended up living my life as a les-
bian, and is there a bias here that I have … I’m 
so sick of hearing about [Viagra] … Just this 
focus on these men, whereas women, you 
know, birth control is a big problem in our 
country. So I think that’s what made me 
cranky. So in this case would you say my per-
sonal preferences affected those choices. 
In contrast, when panelists talk about how they 
evaluate proposals in their own discipline, they gen-
erally uphold the legitimacy of the process by fram-
ing their judgment in universalistic terms, regardless 
of whether that might be said to be idiosyncratic or 
not.
22 
That panelists do not generally frame their prefer-
ence in terms of self-interest is illustrative of   
the codes they use to understand how they “produce 
the sacred” (Durkheim, 1965) or “identify the 
cream” (Lamont, forthcoming). They often refer to a 
supposedly “objective” quality of the proposal
23 and 
to their personal tastes, as affecting both at the same 
time their choice of rankings. This reference to sub-
jective factors does not disrupt the perceived fairness 
of the process of evaluation. Liking what resembles 
oneself leads to self-reproduction when a proposal 
speaks to your discipline, but panelists who express 
their personal taste are not from the same discipline 
as the applicant, their subjectivity is less subject to 
suspicion of self-reproduction and gate-keeping. 
This distancing of personal interest may be pre-
sent in part because it is difficult or even impossible 
to think of a system of interdisciplinary evaluation 
that would entirely bracket personal preferences; 
panelists cannot spell out what defines an “interest-
ing” proposal in the abstract, irrespective of the 
kinds of problems that captivate them personally. 
But in the absence of technical criteria, they behave 
as if they have no alternative but to use their own 
personal understanding of what constitutes a fasci-
nating problem in order to do the work that is ex-
pected of them.
 
Some disciplines and scholars may also be more 
open to making room for personal idiosyncrasies   
because their members are more committed to an   
anti-objectivist epistemological culture according to 
which personal identity influences all aspects of 
scholarly work, as is the case for feminist standpoint 
theory.
24 An anthropologist, who is explicitly aware 
of the need to avoid idiosyncratic judgment, sums 
up: 
Excellence is in some ways is what looks most 
like you. It’s very hard to not do that and I’ve 
tried not to do that, because one of the lessons 
that we learn immediately as anthropologist is, 
there’s a lot of different ways of being in the 
world. So if you can apply cultural relativism to 
proposal writing, then you’re OK. But you 
never fully escape from your own interests, 
your own position, and so on, and so that is 
bound to have some impact. I don’t know that 
that’s necessarily a bad thing when you have a 
panel that’s sufficiently balanced in all sorts of 
ways, including academic discipline, areas of 
expertise, the kind of schools that you come 
from, and then the obvious, race, ethnicity and 
gender. So I do think it is important to bring all 
of those factors into play in creating the panel, 
because you aren’t going to be able to get rid of 
those influences that come in. 
Therefore, we observe a paradoxical situation in in-
terdisciplinary panels. Panelists’ lack of familiarity 
with the technicalities of the disciplinary tools and 
evidence chosen by the applicants allows them to 
express their idiosyncratic tastes with much more 
confidence than expected.
25 For that matter, interdis-
ciplinary panels can be said to be sites where new 
rules of fairness are redefined, reinvented and slowly 
recognized. 
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Conclusion 
Evaluators in interdisciplinary panels must walk a 
fine line between trust and creed to produce a fair 
evaluation. Panelists respect the primacy of discipli-
nary sovereignty, deference to expertise and meth-
odological pluralism. These latter rules ensure the 
preponderance of the voices of experts over non-
experts in interdisciplinary panels. Panelists also 
adopt a range of tactics and strategies designed to 
make other reviewers who lack such expertise trust 
their judgments for being disinterested and unbiased. 
Experts with disciplinary familiarity tend to be 
harder on proposals from their own discipline. But at 
the same time, reviewers with disciplinary distance 
are not afraid to make decisions based on idiosyn-
cratic tastes rather than substantive quality. The in-
clusion of personal tastes in the review process does 
not impinge on panelists’ understanding of the deci-
sion-making process as fair and the outcome as   
legitimate. 
Their lack of familiarity with most of the net-
works of the candidates whose proposals are under 
review allows them to distance their role as knowl-
edge producers (which they often play from within a 
discipline) from their role as evaluators (which 
brings them to evaluate research for which they have 
no personal interest in funding). Therefore, panel-
ists’ lack of disciplinary familiarity with the propos-
als under review has an important effect on the 
decision-making process: it allows personal tastes to 
play a legitimate role in the evaluation process while 
ensuring at the same time that personal interests play 
no role at all in this process. For the evaluation pro-
cess to be viewed as fair by panelists, idiosyncratic 
tastes can matter, whereas interests cannot. 
What we have focused on analyzing are the condi-
tions that lead evaluators on interdisciplinary review 
panels to view their collective work as legitimate, in 
a context where their situation as “peers” is prob-
lematic and not immediately taken for granted. What 
we cannot say is whether the processes of evaluation 
documented in this paper apply beyond multidisci-
plinary panels in the humanities and social sciences, 
or whether alternative rules of fairness will be found 
in contexts other than in US panels.
26 
Disciplinary panels may follow different rules, 
such as those described by Merton, or they be simi-
larly structured by distance and familiarity, trust and 
creed, but centered on subfields instead of disci-
plines; in such a case, deferring to subfield expertise 
would take the place of deferring to disciplinary ex-
pertise. This might be especially likely in fields with 
low levels of consensus or paradigm development 
(Braxton and Hargens, 1996). 
On the other hand, evaluators in disciplinary pan-
els are more familiar with the standards and types of 
evidence used to assess the validity of competing 
theories, and fierce competition among members of 
the same discipline to appropriate the right to speak 
on a topic might be expected regardless of their   
expertise. Therefore, trust in the fairness of the pro-
cess is more likely to be established through critical 
collegial evaluation and dialogue than on blind trust. 
Further research comparing interdisciplinary and in-
tra-disciplinary evaluation would shed light on just 
how unique the process we have described is to in-
terdisciplinary evaluation. 
Notes 
1.  The competitions we studied were not “interdisciplinary” in 
the full sense of the term; all of the panelists were trained in 
a discipline, and all of the proposals were rooted in a disci-
pline, even though they almost all drew on methods, materi-
als and theories from other disciplines. In practice, this is 
true of most research that goes under the rubric of “interdis-
ciplinary” (Klein, 1990).  
2.  We delve in the discussion of how “procedural fairness” (the 
fairness of the decision-making process as opposed to the 
fairness of the outcome) in Mallard et al (under review). That 
paper analyzes how panelists respond to epistemological di-
versity (the presence of diverse epistemological styles in in-
terdisciplinary panels), yet maintain faith in the evaluation 
process. The present paper builds on our previous argument 
to address the broader topic of interdisciplinarity. For a com-
plete discussion of all these aspects, see Lamont 
(forthcoming). 
3.  Hoping to provide a direct empirical comparison between in-
terdisciplinary and disciplinary panels in the social sciences 
and the humanities, we had secured permission to study 
disciplinary panels from the division of the Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences at the National Science Foundation. However, 
invoking the Privacy Act, access was ultimately denied by 
NSF’s General Counsel’s office. 
4.  The privileging of interdisciplinary proposals on these panels 
is underscored by a historian who explains that in order to be 
successful, applicants have to appeal to scholars with a 
range of interests and intellectual horizons. They have to “be 
able to hit a basic threshold of significance … and that has to 
do with ‘how is somebody outside of that field going to read 
this?’ If you can reach people outside your field, you’re inter-
disciplinary, you know, you’ve reached across the discipli-
nary divide.” 
5.  The specific competitions studied were the International Dis-
sertation Field Research Fellowship program of the Social 
Science Research Council and the American Council of 
Learned Societies; the Women’s Studies Dissertation Grant 
Program at the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foun-
dation; and the Fellowship Program in the Humanities of the 
American Council of Learned Societies. 
6.  The evaluative process adopted by most funding organiza-
tions proceeds in two steps: first, individual screeners elimi-
nate a large number of proposals; then, panels of evaluators 
discuss finalists in face-to-face meetings and select 
awardees. This paper concerns only the second stage of 
evaluation.  
7.  The competitions we studied have a program officer, a panel 
chair, or both. Program officers are PhD holders who may or 
may not have had an academic career and who are full-time 
employees of the funding agency. Panel chairs are generally 
established academics, and they preside over the panel for a 
few years only.  
8.  We secured permission to observe the deliberations of two 
competitions. One of them was observed three times; the 
other only once. We are excluding this data from the paper, 
however, because we did not gain access to all the delibera-
tions. We used the field notes gathered during these delib-
erations to probe panelists about specific arguments they 
had made at the time. The fact that the interviewer is a 
scholar who has served on a number of evaluation panels 
was essential in facilitating openness among interviewees. 
All respondents were guaranteed anonymity, and we made a 
commitment to the participating organizations to disguise all 
information potentially leading to the identification of panel-
ists or applicants. 
9.  For this purpose, we used the formal ranking of applicants Overcoming obstacles to interdisciplinary evaluation 
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produced by panelists prior to deliberations, which they pro-
vided to the program officer or chair.  
10.  Panelists also were asked to describe their criteria of evalua-
tion beyond the context of the panel — for instance, how 
they recognize excellence in their graduate students, among 
their colleagues, and in their own work. They also were 
asked whether they believe in academic excellence and 
why. They engaged in strategies of presentation of self dur-
ing the interviews, that we regard as behavioral and attitudi-
nal data. Thus, we do not regard interview data as merely 
post-hoc, potentially distorted data.  
11.  Having panelists provide several complementary accounts of 
‘what happened’ is the best research strategy in the absence 
of deliberation transcripts (unavailable due to confidentiality 
issues). In cases where observations were permitted, they 
confirmed the reliability of this retrospective interview 
method.  
12.  We use brackets to denote details we have changed to pro-
tect the identity of the panelist or proposal. 
13.  Panelists adopt somewhat different definitions of a ‘good’ in-
terdisciplinary proposal depending on the discipline from 
which proposals originate. In the case of humanistic as com-
pared to social science scholarship, for instance, they put a 
greater premium on theoretical innovation and the originality 
of the topic than on methodological innovation — a contrast 
that we analyzed in the case of disciplinary understandings 
of originality (Guetzkow et al, 2004) and that is explored in 
Abbott (2001; 2004). 
14.  This situation raises a specific problem in interdisciplinary 
evaluation in light of what Merton (1973[1942]) describes for 
disciplinary evaluation, particularly with respect to the obser-
vance of the norms of “communalism”, which prescribes that 
scientists ought to make public their evidence and proce-
dures concerning data gathering and analysis, and “organ-
ized skepticism”, which prescribes that truth claims should 
be subject to critical examination based on evidence by in-
formed peers. In interdisciplinary evaluation, these norms 
break down in practice, to the extent that panelists often lack 
familiarity with the evidence under consideration and the 
methods employed to make sense of the empirical material. 
15.  Panelists vary in age, race and gender, and they represent 
institutions of uneven prestige; these characteristics influ-
ence how much weight their opinions have in collective deci-
sion-making.  
16.  Members of funding committees, which are generally part of 
large bureaucracies (such as the National Science Founda-
tion or the Social Science Research Council), usually ex-
press their faith in the legitimacy of rational-legal orders 
(GAO, 1994). Panelists believe in the possibility of identifying 
the best proposals, because funding decisions are made by 
knowledgeable scholars who have demonstrated throughout 
their career an impressive command of their field.
 
See also 
the large literature on cultural authority and on how scientists 
go about establishing their expertise (Abbott, 1988; Jasanoff, 
1990; Shapin and Schaeffer, 1985). 
17.  Although we sometimes describe panelists’ actions in strate-
gic terms, we cannot say whether the behavior we describe 
here and subsequently is instrumental or not. For example, 
judging one’s own discipline more harshly could be a form of 
‘impression management’ where panel members are instru-
mentally trying to make the impression that their judgments 
are fair; or it could simply be that their expertise leads them 
to be more critical because they feel more confident to cast 
judgment. We suspect that their actions combine elements 
of both. For example, even though their judgments are 
based on expertise, the fact that they announce it is done for 
instrumental reasons. 
18.  This rule corresponds to Merton’s classical definition of uni-
versal judgements (as opposed to particularistic ones), 
which are made based on “pre-established impersonal crite-
ria consonant with observations and with previously con-
firmed knowledge”, and which are opposed to “particularistic” 
criteria such as “the personal or social attributes of their pro-
tagonists; their race, nationality, religion, class, and personal 
qualities are as such irrelevant” (Merton 1973 [1942]: 270). 
In canonical studies of peer review, such as the one of the 
NSF by Cole et al, (1978: 33–34), the authors propose that 
particularism “could refer to scientists with a common view of 
their fields who will appraise work only by others with similar 
views; it could refer to social networks of friendship … and it 
could refer to social positions; that is, those scientists who 
achieve eminence tend to favor the proposals of others who 
are similarly situated in the hierarchy of science.” 
19.  In disciplinary panels, it can be expected that applicants and 
referees usually include acquaintances of the evaluators, 
which is likely to color their judgments, given that level of 
trust is affected by network connections (Burt, 2005; Cook, 
2005). The study of varying levels of inter-network connec-
tion between evaluators in disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
panels is a path worth following. 
20.  The funding agencies provide clear guidelines delineating 
the obligation to abstain when the work of close colleagues, 
friends, and direct advisees is being discussed. It is however 
impossible to know if disclosures about indirect personal ties 
are done on a systematic basis.  
21.  This relationship between one’s ability to display a sense of 
disinterestedness and an eclectic taste on one side, and 
one’s scarcity of resources on the other side, has been un-
earthed by sociologists of culture. Bourdieu (1984 [1979]) 
wrote that those who lack economic and cultural resources 
can only make the “choice of the necessary” and cannot af-
ford the luxury of disinterested behaviors, whereas those 
who Peterson and Kern (1996) call “cultural omnivores” have 
the strongest economic resources.  
22.  Similarly, we find that panelists tend to define originality in 
ways that are in line with the type of originality that their own 
work exhibits. In Guetzkow et al (2003), we detail various 
types of originality and we show that the types of originality 
that panelists attribute to their own work tend to overlap with 
the types of originality they attribute to the proposals under 
review — a phenomenon that sociologists label “homophily”, 
which “limits people’s social worlds in a way that has power-
ful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes 
they form, and the interactions they experience” (McPherson 
et al, 2001). 
23.  When attempting to “identify the cream”, evaluators often 
resonate with what Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart 
once famously said about pornography: “I cannot define it, 
but I can recognize it when I see it.” It is interesting to note 
that, when asked to define “academic excellence”, several of 
our panelists used these exact same terms. 
24.  This question will be explored in Lamont (forthcoming). See 
also Marcus and Fischer (1986); Smith (1990) and Mallard et 
al (under review) on the association between disciplines and 
epistemological styles, including the constructivist style, 
which is more popular in the humanities than the social   
sciences. 
25.  An expression that standard approaches to peer review 
would find incompatible with the norm of universalism or/and 
disinterestedness. 
26.  A review of the literature on peer review in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France suggests that the belief in 
the fairness of peer review is less widely held in France than 
in the USA (Lamont and Mallard, 2005). The particularistic 
aspects of French academia are also highlighted in many 
essays on French intellectuals and French academia (see 
for example Debray, 1979). 
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